We examine the association between financial integration and capital market transparency of emerging-market firms. We use four intra-year price timeliness measures derived from the Beekes and Brown (2006, 2007) methods as indicators of the firm's transparency. The sample comprises 57,465 firm-year observations on listed companies in 24 emerging economies over the period 1995-2010. As expected, we find that greater financial integration is associated with greater transparency, and that the effect is more pronounced when the news about the firm is bad. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), we find evidence of a mechanism through which financial integration enhances the information environment: improved corporate governance.
Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in the degree of financial integration in emerging economies in the past few decades.
1 A growing body of literature has reported the beneficial effects of financial integration in lowering the cost of equity capital (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000) , stimulating economic growth (Bekaert et al., 2001) , expanding financing options (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006; Lucey and Zhang, 2011) , and improving firm performance Giannetti and Ongena, 2009 ).
There is also evidence showing that financial integration can improve the information environment faced by firms (Bae et al., 2006) . Our study contributes to this literature by examining the association between financial integration and four timeliness measures of equity market transparency derived from the Brown (2006, 2007) approach. These innovative measures add to existing indicators of the firm's information environment (e.g., properties of security analysts' earnings forecasts) by examining the intra-year price discovery process. The method we use can be adapted to identify the timeliness of the recognition of different types of value-relevant information (e.g., good news versus bad news), thereby providing new insights into the relationship between financial integration and transparency to investors.
Our sample comprises 57,465 firm-year observations on 10,124 unique companies domiciled in 24 developing countries during the period 1995-2010. The dependent variables are four measures of the intra-year timeliness of price discovery, which proxy for the equity market transparency of a firm.
Two of the four are raw price timeliness measures and the remaining two relate to the timeliness of good and of bad news. The independent variables of interest include two country-level measures of financial integration developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) . We also construct a cross-listing dummy variable to indicate the international exposure of a firm. Results from the univariate and multivariate tests generally indicate timelier price discovery when financial integration is higher. In addition, we find that greater financial integration is associated with more timely price discovery of bad news relative to good. Cross-listed firms have slower timeliness of good news, implying they adopt more conservative disclosure practices. Importantly, our work suggests that financial integration can help to resolve information and agency problems, and ultimately to influence the speed of price discovery in the longer term.
We explicitly test a potential mechanism, corporate governance, through which financial integration improves the information environment of a firm. To do so, we focus on Chinese listed firms and use both simple regression analysis and structural equation modelling (SEM). We find evidence that financial integration has both direct and indirect effects on the timeliness of bad news, with indirect effects arising through the mechanism of corporate governance. Specifically, financial integration is associated with better corporate governance such that better-governed firms are associated with more timely pricing of bad news.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the most closely related literature and formulate our predictions. Section 3 describes the data and variables, and Section 4 presents the results. Concluding remarks are made in Section 5.
Related literature and predictions

Financial integration and the information environment in emerging markets
Our main prediction is that greater financial integration improves the quality of the information environment faced by local firms. Previous studies provide evidence to support the prediction. Li et al. (2004) find that greater capital market openness is associated with higher firm-specific variation in returns and lower comovement in emerging markets. They indicate their finding could be explained by several possibilities such as reduced tunnelling because of greater transparency, less investor herding, and the activities of informed arbitrageurs. Bae et al. (2006) focus on country-level market liberalization in a sample of emerging markets and find that increased openness to foreign equity investors is associated with increases in firm-specific information, analyst coverage, and analyst value-added, and decreases in earnings management. Bae et al.' s findings suggest that the transition of an emerging stock market into one that is integrated with the global capital market alters the local environment for disclosure, information production, and the analysis and use of information, and attracts foreign capital to the home country.
Another strand of literature focuses on the effects of cross listing on foreign exchanges. Baker et al. (2002) and Lang et al. (2003) report increases in analyst coverage, forecast accuracy, and news stories after firms cross-list. Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine the relationship between the prices in the home and host markets for a sample of Canadian firms that were cross-listed in the U.S., and find that their stock prices in the Canadian and U.S. markets are cointegrated and mutually adjusting. Korczak and Bohl (2005) and Liu (2007) find that when firms are cross-listed on more established overseas exchanges, their home-market pricing efficiency as indicated by stock return autocorrelation is enhanced. Su and Chong (2007) document that trading in both Hong Kong and the U.S. contributes to the price-discovery process for Chinese stocks cross-listed in the two markets. The results of these studies suggest that a better information environments in a home market, whereby more information about the fundamentals of cross-listed firms can be revealed, feed back into the home market prices, effectively improving the information environment and pricing efficiency of the home market.
In light of the studies described above, which suggest that financial integration is positively associated with other aspects of the information environment, we predict that financial integration increases the speed of intra-year price discovery; for example, information related to price-sensitive earnings announcements tends to be incorporated into share prices in a timelier fashion (Ball and Brown, 1968) in countries that are more closely integrated with the world's financial markets. (In the present context, price discovery, as described by 2007 , is the process whereby value-relevant, private information is incorporated into a stock's publicly observable market price.) Specifically, we test the following hypothesis:
The degree of financial integration is positively associated with the timeliness of price discovery in emerging markets.
Besides unconditional price timeliness, we are also interested in asymmetry in the recognition of good and bad news. Unconditional price timeliness is the net effect of corporate disclosures, combined with the actions of information intermediaries, traders, market agents, and investors. There are good reasons why disclosure can be valuable to a firm. For instance, low information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors can improve a firm's ability to issue securities and reduce its cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000) .
Delayed disclosure can be punished by stock price penalties imposed by investors (Cornell and Landsman, 1989; Beekes et al., 2014) . Disclosure may also prevent claims resulting from legal action against inadequate disclosure to current and potential investors, especially when there is impending bad news (Skinner, 1994 (Skinner, , 1997 . Notwithstanding the benefits of timely disclosure, the imbalance in corporate disclosures of good and bad news is a familiar topic in the literature. On one hand, managers tend to withhold bad news due to their private incentives (Kothari et al., 2009) . For instance, the disclosure of bad news will incur costs arising from career-related concerns, lower bonus payments and a loss in wealth as a result of the stock price decline. In our setting, agency problems are relatively severe because of features of emerging markets such as weak financial and legal institutions. As a result, emerging-market firms are more likely to withhold bad news relative to good news. We thus test the following hypothesis:
The positive effect of financial integration is more pronounced on the timeliness of bad news than on the timeliness of good news.
Corporate governance as a potential mechanism for financial integration
Previous works suggest that the scrutiny of foreign investors, foreign equity analysts, and foreign stock market listing standards can help improve the information environment by fostering higher quality disclosure and governance standards to emerging-market firms (e.g., Obstfeld, 1998; Stulz, 1999; Doidge et al., 2004) . Stulz (1999) indicates that the different assessments of the value of a project made by management and investors act as another cause of expensive external capital. The "information asymmetry" problem and "agency cost" problem could be manifest in variation in assessments, and effective monitoring of management could mitigate these problems. As Stulz argues, financial globalization and integration will improve the monitoring of management through mechanisms such as the board of directors, the capital market, the legal system, active shareholders, the market for corporate control, and the public disclosure of information by firms. Doidge et al. (2004) model the trade-off whereby controlling shareholders either expropriate as much of the firm's resources as possible from minority shareholders or increase resources by committing to limit their expropriation activities so that firms can raise lower-cost capital from foreign exchanges. Their model predicts that the cost of raising external capital will fall with enhanced corporate governance. Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence supporting their prediction in that they find a positive relationship between international institutional investments and the strength ('quality') of the corporate governance of local firms. Another strand of literature has examined the effects of corporate governance on disclosure and the information environment of the firm. Aman et al. (2011) find that corporate governance in Japan is associated with increased disclosure and a greater analyst following, but not with more timely price discovery. Beekes et al. (2012a) find that better corporate governance leads to a higher analyst following, lower dispersion in analysts' forecasts, and greater forecast accuracy in Canada. Beekes and Brown (2006) and Beekes et al. (2014) find evidence of timelier price discovery for better-governed Australian firms. Hass et al. (2014) show that the positive effect of corporate governance is more pronounced on the timeliness of bad news than on that of good news in China. Thus we predict:
H 3 : Firms in more closely integrated economies have higher quality of governance which leads to greater transparency.
Data and variables
Sample selection
Our data set relates to 10,124 public companies domiciled in 24 emerging markets covering the period from 1995 to 2010. We obtain firms' price and financial data from Datastream and Worldscope, data on cross-listing from the Bank of New York Mellon, data on country-level financial integration from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Chinn and Ito (2006) , data on country-level financial and macroeconomic variables from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013) , data on the information flow of a country from the KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006) , and data on legal institutions from La Porta et al. (1998) . To avoid survivorship bias, we include firms delisted during the sample period. We exclude firms with missing timeliness estimates and control variables (to be discussed later). We also exclude financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) due to their unique accounting and financial characteristics. The selection process results in a final sample of 57,465 firm-year observations.
Measuring price timeliness
The measure of price timeliness is derived from Beekes and Brown's (2006) approach. The measure has its origins in the seminal work of Ball and Brown (1968) , which showed that annual income reports are not a timely source of earnings-related information because most of the value-relevant component of earnings (85%-90%) has already been captured by more timely media. Because the Ball and Brown measure focuses on a single point in time, it seems more suitable to assess how accurately a firm's share price (P t ), observed at daily intervals throughout the year, approximates its terminal value (P 0 ), which in line with earlier literature we take to be the market's valuation two weeks (14 days) after the annual earnings release date. Specifically, we calculate the timeliness of price discovery (T) as
where P t is the market-adjusted share price, which is observed at daily intervals from day -365 until day -1, and P 0 is the price 14 days after the release date. 2 -0.5/365 is an adjustment made to recognize the flow of information, which is reflected in returns during the course of the trading day. Because idiosyncratic volatility inflates the measure when it is calculated at the individual firm-year level, following Beekes and Brown (2006) we also generate a deflated timeliness metric (TD), which is the timeliness metric divided by one plus the absolute rate of return on the share over the 365-day period used to calculate the share's timeliness metric.
The idea behind the timeliness measures is straightforward. The longer it takes a firm's share price to capture information and converge to its "final" price P 0 (which reflects all value-relevant information discovered during the year), the larger is the value of T (TD). A high value for T (TD) thus indicates low intra-year timeliness. In contrast, if all the information that affects the final price was incorporated on day -365, T (TD) would be at its minimum, and the speed of adjustment at its maximum. We can interpret T (TD) as a measure of how much value-relevant information is, on the average day, already known from other sources before prices finally 'settle' following the release of the firm's annual earnings number. In this sense, the variable is inextricably linked to other valuerelevant disclosures that are more timely than the announcement of earnings for the year.
We use the approach discussed in Beekes and Brown (2007) to calculate two additional measures of timeliness: timeliness of good news, and timeliness of bad news. For the timeliness of good news, we first construct a time series of good news returns, which includes positive market-adjusted daily log returns. If the day's return is less than zero, we set the good news return on that day to zero.
We then create a cumulative log return series, , by setting and combining the good news return series as from day -364 to day 0:
To suppress noise from bid-ask bounce, we chose the third quartile as the filter. The raw (unadjusted) returns are filtered at the third quartile to mitigate undue noise (e.g., from bid-ask bounce). 3 An equivalent procedure is adopted for bad news.
Measuring financial integration
We gauge the degree of financial integration using both de jure and de facto measures. De jure measures emphasize changes in policy and legal controls on cross-border capital flows. Capital controls take many forms, including controls on inflows versus controls on outflows, quantity controls versus price controls, or restrictions on foreign equity holdings. The imposition/relaxation of these controls reflects the dynamics of a country's financial market openness. Despite the increasing sophistication of de jure measures, there are several potential drawbacks to relying on this approach.
First, de jure measures may not accurately reflect the actual degree of openness of the capital market because they are partially based on various restrictions associated with foreign exchange transactions that may not necessarily impede capital flows (Kose et al., 2006) . Second, even though governments officially pronounce the openness of their financial markets, it is likely that domestic and foreign investors and institutions show little interest in the announcements when they are made. Third, de jure measures do not capture the time-varying nature of financial integration. Unlike de jure indicators, de facto measures focus on the degree to which a country has made use of international financial markets, in practice, over time. Given the numerous candidate measures, we select financial integration measures based on their appropriateness in terms of relevance and data coverage. An added requirement is that the measure(s) are time-varying such that they reveal the dynamic nature of integration and achieve some predictive success in empirical studies. 4 We adopt the de jure openness index developed by Chinn and Ito (2006) . The index is aimed at measuring the extent of openness in capital controls based on information in the IMF's Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Chinn and Ito use a
binary coding system to transform information about the liberty in cross-border financial transactions into a quantitative scale. Higher values of the restriction-based index indicate greater openness of a country to cross-border capital transactions. We label the index as KAOPEN in our study.
We also make use of a de facto measure, which draws upon the updated and extended version of a dataset constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007 Finally, we include a firm-level integration measure, namely an indicator variable DR, indicating whether the firm's shares are traded on a foreign stock exchange through Depository Receipts. The indicator variable is equal to one if a firm has a Depository Receipt on issue in a given year, and zero otherwise. Cross-listing could affect a firm's visibility and disclosure standards and therefore its price timeliness. Data on firms cross-listed on the U.S. and other exchanges is obtained from the Bank of New York Mellon's website. The dataset includes the name of the company issuing the DR, the DR's trading symbol, the country in which the DRs are registered, the DR type, the primary exchange, the DR listing exchange and the effective date of issue.
Empirical results
Estimation models
To examine the effects of financial integration on price timeliness, we use the following regression models, which include country, year and industry fixed-effects.
T, TG and TB stand for timeliness, timeliness of good news and timeliness of bad news. FINITI represents the financial integration variables. As suggested by prior literature (e.g., Beekes et al., 2012b; Holthausen, 2009; Leuz et al., 2003; Morck et al., 2000; Yu, 2011) , it is likely that the variation in equity market transparency depends on macroeconomic and institutional differences between countries. We include five variables to control for the information, economic, and institutional environment of a country. These variables (explained in more detail in Table 1 ) include an information flow index (GINFOR), a dummy variable of legal origin (COMMON), the annual percentage change in the consumer price index (INFL), the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPPC), and the ratio of total value of stock traded over GDP (STKTRD). At firm level, we control for firm size (SIZE) because larger firms are likely to disclose more frequently and be more transparent (Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Lundholm, 1993, 1996) . SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of market capitalization in U.S. dollars (Worldscope item 07210). We control for profitability (PROFIT) by including the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (Worldscope item 18198) to total assets (Worldscope item 02999). Firms that are more highly levered may release more information to shareholders (Taylor et al., 2012) . Thus firms that are more highly levered may be the subject of more efficient price discovery. We control for financial leverage (LEV)
by including the ratio of total debt (Worldscope item 03255) to total assets. We control for growth opportunities (BM) by including the ratio of total shareholder's equity (Worldscope item 03995) to market capitalization (Worldscope item 08001). Firms with greater volatility of performance may release additional information on a timely basis, but the timeliness of price discovery can be detrimentally affected by their fluctuating performance (Beekes and Brown, 2006 GNEWS, to denote a good news year. GNEWS is equal to one if the firm outperforms the market over the timeliness estimation period, and zero otherwise. The reason for its inclusion is that managers tend to reveal good news to investors immediately, while they withhold bad news.
[Insert Table 1 about here] Table 2 [Insert Table 2 about here] The degree of financial integration is also high in wealthy countries. The correlation analyses provide prima facie evidence that greater financial integration is associated with an increase in the speed of price discovery, which is consistent with our main prediction. In the next section, we further explore the relationship using multivariate regressions.
Univariate analysis
[Insert Table 3 about here] Table 4 presents the results of estimating Eq. (3). The dependent variable in the first three columns, labeled (1), (2), and (3), is share price timeliness (T) shown in Eq. (1). The dependent variable in the last three columns, labeled (4), (5), and (6), is share price timeliness deflated (TD). We test the effects of the financial integration variables. Columns (1) and (4) present the results for the de facto measure, LMF, and columns (2) and (5) increase in the speed of price discovery, implying a better information environment for firms.
Multivariate analysis
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Regarding the control variables, we find that countries with a higher GDP per capita (GDPPC) see a more timely reflection of firms' performance in their share prices. However, we do not find consistent and significant effects in the case of the other economic and institutional variables. At the firm level, SIZE is negatively associated with timeliness, confirming other evidence (e.g., Beekes and Brown, 2006; Beekes et al., 2012a Beekes et al., , 2012b Beekes et al., 2014 ) that larger firms have faster price discovery.
PROFIT and BM are negatively related to timeliness. The two risk variables (LEV and RETVOL) have positive effects on timeliness. GNEWS is positively related to timeliness in all specifications, suggesting slower price discovery when investors receive, on balance, good news over the year. between financial integration and the speed of recognition of good news. The negative and significant coefficient on LMF for the timeliness of bad news suggests that the price discovery of bad news is faster when cross-border investments reach higher levels. The coefficient on KAOPEN is negative and significant for the timeliness of both good and bad news, suggesting the presence of a beneficial effect of capital market openness on the speed of recognition of value-relevant news. The coefficient on KAOPEN is larger in value for the timeliness of bad news (-0.051 in column (5) and -0.048 in column (6)) than for the timeliness of good news (-0.034 in columns (2) and -0.035 in and (3)). In addition, cross-listed firms (DR) have slower timeliness of good news (coefficient=0.039 from columns (1) to (3)), but faster timeliness of bad news (-0.062 in columns (4) to (6)). Our results support H 2 , which states that financial integration enhances the disclosure and recognition of bad news relative to good news. Note that the deterrents against withholding bad news are increased litigation risk and a greater stock price impact at the end of the year (Cornell and Landsman, 1989; Skinner, 1994 Skinner, , 1997 Baginski et al., 2002) . In this regard, financial integration has important implications for emerging markets since the legal systems and capital markets are still less developed in these countries.
[Insert Table 5 about here]
A potential mechanism of financial integration
In this section, we examine a mechanism, namely corporate governance, potentially affected by financial integration, which in turn affects the information environment of emerging-market firms. To proportion of total number of shares on issue (MANAGEMENT); and whether the auditor is a member of one of the joint ventures between a Big Four international audit firm and a domestic audit firm (BIG4). We impose a criterion for each attribute and construct a dummy variable that is set equal to one if the governance attribute in question meets that criterion in a given year and zero otherwise. We then sum the six dummy variables to create a single governance score, denoting the result as CG.
A higher CG value is interpreted as indicating better corporate governance.
Panel A of [Insert Table 6 about here]
Path analysis
As shown in column (1) of Table 7 , CG is positively related to FINITI, which is measured by the cross-listing dummy variable. This is in line with our prediction that exposure to international investors could contribute to the market transparency of a firm. Columns (2) to (5) of Table 7 present the relationship between financial integration and timeliness without including CG, while CG is included in columns (6) to (9). The mediating effects of CG can be identified to some extent. The coefficient of FINITI in column (5), without CG, is -0.226 and is significant at the 1% level; but it drops to -0.216 when CG is included.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
The results of structural equation modelling (SEM) are presented in Table 8 . The equations in the SEM include a regression of one of the outcome variables, T, TD, TG or TB, on the mediating variable (CG), and a regression of the mediating variable, CG, on the source variable, FINITI. The regression coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. As expected, the direct effect of FINITI on TG and TB is significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. Also, the path estimates of FINITI to CG are significant at the 1% level for all models. The indirect effect is the product of the direct path coefficients leading to and from the mediating variable. The indirect effect is the product of rows I and II. We test the significance of the indirect effects using the Sobel (1982) test statistic. As shown in column (4), financial integration (FINITI) improves the timeliness of bad news through corporate governance (CG). Specifically, the indirect or product coefficient for TB is -0.001 and statistically significant at the 5% level.
[Insert Table 8 about here]
Conclusions
We examine the effect of international financial integration on the timeliness of price discovery in emerging economies. For this purpose, we use a sample of 55,790 firm-year observations from 24 countries over the period 1995 to 2010. We measure raw price timeliness and the timeliness of good/bad news as proposed by Brown (2006, 2007) . We consider two country-level financial integration metrics, one looking at the intensity of capital controls, the other focusing on actual portfolio investment flows. We construct a cross-listing dummy variable as the firm-level integration measure. We also control for several possibly correlated factors that may affect price timeliness.
Univariate and multivariate analysis suggests that financial integration is positively associated with price timeliness. In addition, we find that financial integration improves the timeliness of bad news relative to good news. Taken as a whole, the results are consistent with a firm having an improved information environment when financial integration is higher. Finally, we examine a mechanism through which financial integration increases timeliness. We find evidence of both direct and indirect effects, with indirect effects resulting from better corporate governance. Chinn and Ito (2006) DR A firm-level dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is cross-listed on a foreign exchange in that year and zero otherwise.
Bank of New York Mellon
Panel C: Country-level control variables STKTRD
The ratio of the total value of stocks traded on official stock exchanges in a country to that country's GDP.
World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2013)
GINFOR Information flow of a country, measured using data such as internet users (per 1,000 people), television (per 1,000 people), and trade in newspapers (percentage of GDP).
KOF Index of Globalization (Dreher, 2006) COMMON A dummy variable that is equal to one if the country adopts the British common law system and zero otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1998)
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RETVOL
The standard deviation of daily stock returns over the 360 days prior to the end of the year. Datastream GNEWS A dummy variable that is equal to one when the company's share price outperforms the market over the year and zero otherwise. Table 1 for the variable definitions. All time-varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. The values of the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table 1 for the variable definitions. All time-varying variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). Table 1 for the variable definitions. We include three ownership variables to control for the governance characteristics that are not included in the aggregate CG score, but that will influence the information environment. These variables are state-owned shares as a proportion of the total number of shares (STATE), non-tradable shares as a proportion of the total number of shares (NONTRADE), and shares held by the largest shareholder as a proportion of the total number of shares (TOP1). We also include TRADE, which is defined as the natural logarithm of the value of stocks traded of the year, deflated by the natural logarithm of market index at the beginning of the year. All time-varying variables (except CG) are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. The estimation method is pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) with standard errors clustered by firm. Standardized regression coefficients are reported with t-statistics in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests). (SEM) of the direct effect of financial integration on the timeliness of price discovery as well as the indirect effect of financial integration on price timeliness though improved corporate governance. The equations in the SEM include a regression of one of the outcome variables, T, TD, TG or TB, on the mediating variable (CG), and a regression of the mediating variable, CG, on the source variable, FINITI. We present the unstandardized path coefficients with z-statistics in parentheses. The significance of the indirect effect is assessed using the Sobel (1982) test. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed tests).
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